During the Winter War (1939-1940) the Soviet Union threatened Finland's independence through political and military offensives which the Finns successfully managed to resist and remained independent. The Finns' achievement to thwart the Soviet Union's military attack was a result of many elements favouring the Finns and their determination to remain independent. The large patriotic feeling, suspicions and preparation for a war against the Soviet Union promoted a strong defence. The military success of the Finns at the beginning of the war was due to the tactics that were used, the advantage that the harsh winter conditions gave the Finns over the Soviets and the invaders being unprepared and underestimating their opponent. Even though the advantage turned against Finland it was too late for the ill prepared Soviet Union to militarily take over Finland, due to the appalling defeats and concern of western involvement in the war. Political support for the Helsinki government and boycott of the Soviet's puppet government throughout the war forced the Soviet Union to disband its attempt of a political take over of Finland. The truce on domestic conflicts - between political ideologies - brought unity to Finland and enabled a strong spirited defence against the Soviet Union. Careful consideration of Western involvement allowed Finland to avoid being involved in a larger conflict that would have jeopardised her survival. Finally the submission to the unjust demands of the Soviet Union after all available options were flawed and the Red Army penetrated the front. The cessions of 1940 were economically and psychologically damaging to Finland, but allowed her to remain independent.
As the Republic of Finland was only young before the Winter War the Finns were vigilant to encroachments of their independence. Being granted independence by Lenin in 1917 during the Bolshevik revolution, Finland fought to keep. it during a Civil War between the White and Red forces. The victory of the Whites ensured the continuation of a capitalist system and the remaining Reds were dealt with severely. From 1908 to 1917 Finland had been under a Grand Duchy of Russia. Between 1323 and 1809, the Finns were subjects under the monarch of Sweden.
Nationalism had been rapidly growing in Finland since about 1890 as a result of the implementation of Russification policies, such as the abolishment of the legislation (1899) and other opressive acts by the Russians. Nationalism in Finland during this time was also influenced and promoted by nationalists like Sibelius.<1> After the civil war it was generally accepted by political leaders in Finland that the Soviet Union would remain a threat to Finland's independence - due to the Soviet Union advocating of comintern - and would have to be considered an enemy.<2> The difficulties in establishing good trade relations and western influence in Finland alienated her from the Soviet Union.<3> Since the Finns had only had their independence sovereignty for a relatively short time, the nationalistic feeling in Finland before the Winter War was quite high. This gave the Finns the unity, morale and sprit to defend their nation against the Soviet attack.<4>
The Finns' suspicions of the Soviet Union were soon discovered as justified. The signing of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany outline each of their spheres of interest (23 August 1939). Finland was in the Soviet sphere, which was not known by the Finns at the time. As Germany began to annex their sphere in September, the Soviets began to make demands from Finland. Negotiations led by the Soviets, under the pretence of national security, occurred betveen October and November of 1939. The Soviets desired to have a mutual assistance pact, the leasing of the Hanko peninsula, an exchange of area in Karelia for islands in the Gulf, push the Karelian Isthmus border a couple hundred miles away from Leningrad and Finland to destroy all border fortifications. Finland's involvement with the Scandinavian neutrals (December 1935) prohibited any concessions to another power.<5> Public opinion also clearly stated that no concessions should be made to the Soviet Union, as they believed that it was an attempt by the Soviet Union to 'violate their rights' and endanger their independence.<6> The Soviets believed that Finland was too weak to maintain neutrality and would be used in an attack against the Soviet Union. As the Soviets saw negotiations as unavailing, they used a border incident in an attempt to achieve their goals. The shelling of a Soviet post in the village of Mainila provided provocation for an attack, blaming the Finns the Soviets had created a classic casus belli.<7> They demanded that Finland withdraw its troops from the border. If the Finns had complied with these demands it would have been interpreted that they were guilty for the attack on Mainila. The Finns, unable to negotiate with the Soviets, remained in their positions and the Soviets declared war on 30 November 1939.
Finland's achievement in thwarting the Red Army' s attack shocked the world and averted a military takeover by the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed that Finland would be occupied within a few weeks, warning military commanders not to accidentally cross Sweden's border.<8> The attack was repressed by the Finns' ability to quickly mobilise and their border fortifications, which were largely built by volunteers.<9> However, in the years before the war there was no increase in military spending due to expenditure on the Olympic games that were to be held in Helsinki. This left the Finnish military with unsubstantial supplies to fight a war (see Appendix). The Finns compromised their lack of arms by using home-made weapons, for example petrol bombs (Molotov cocktails).<10> Early success in the Battles of Tolvajarvi and Sumussalmi gave a psychological boost to the Finnish army and humiliated the Soviet Union.<11>
The Finnish achievement in nullifying the Soviet Attack was a result of a harsh winter and the Red Army being unprepared for what it had to contend with. The short winter nights restricted the Soviets' bombing campaigns. The Soviets were unprepared for the war that confronted them, inexperienced in 'breaking through permanent lines of defenses and combating in the Finnish environment, with deep. snow and dense forest'.<12> The Finns employed their expertise of skiing and knowledge of the forest - which was 'a dogma in their training'<13> - to make surprise attacks on the Red Army. The not-yet-frozen lakes and swamps were obstacles for Soviets and forced them to remain on narrow tracks that left them open to ambush. The guerrilla tactics of moving quickly in small numbers gave the Finnish army the upper hand at the beginning of the war, as the mobility of the Soviet army was inhibited by natural conditions and the massive size of their operations.<14> The main strategy used by the Finns was to split the Soviet divisions into small groups (described as mottis, bundles of firewood) and then eliminating them singly was effective and lowered the morale of the Red Army.<15> The success of the Finns led the Western Powers to offer military support, which stimulated the Soviets to begin looking for efficient solutions to end the war.
As the war continued the winter advantage turned against the Finns and the Mannerheim Line became weakened. The lakes, swamps and sections in the gulf of Finland that impeded the Red Army began to freeze deeply enough to allow heavy artillery to cross. This enabled the Soviets to out-flank the Mannerheim Line, which resulted in large bombardments and massive storming of the Finnish resistance. Also, the Mannerheim Line was greatly impeded after Stalin intensified the attack on Finland on 7 January 1940, dedicating nearly a million troops to the Finnish problem and concentrating the attack on the Karilian Isthmus front. Finland had no reserves, which the Soviets exploited with continuous bombardments and attacks aimed to wear the Finnish army down.<16> However, the Soviet victories were too late and could do little to redeem the humiliation of the troubles that Finland had caused. The Soviet Union had lost 48,745 men and 158,000 were wounded,<17> compared to the Finns who had 22,000 dead and 43,000 wounded.<18> It was best for both sides to begin negotiations; for the Soviet Union it would end the embarrassment of appalling defeats and for Finland to end a war that they could never win.
The only foreign assistance Finland received at the beginning of the Winter War was in the form of diplomatic support and material aid for civilians, but this did help. the Finns in their fight to remain independent. Finland made several request for military aid, which were usually denied or replied with evasive answers. Although Finland had sympathy all over the world, direct military assistance was not favoured by most countries as weapons and men were needed for their own preparations for war. Also, other diplomatic considerations had to be made, the United States wanted to remain neutral, but did give a financial loan 'for civilian purposes'.<19> England and France offered direct military support near the end of the war, but this was mainly for their own benefit.<20> The port of Petsamo in the North of Finland was thought of as a strategic point to the Western Powers in their war against Germany and possibly the Soviet Union, if relations broke down in the East.<21> Germany, who had assisted in their independence, did not offer any support, due to their non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and Finland's denunciation of Nazism.<22> The League of Nations in its last days stated that all League nations should support Finland and expelled the Soviet Union from the League due to violations of treaties that she signed. Although Finland received no foreign assistance on the front, the assistance it did receive helped the strengthen the nation's morale and defence.
Finland's appeal for assistance was answered in the last months of the war, however the Finns had to assess the implications of involving other nations in the confrontation. In an attempt to keep. the war localised, appeals to Sweden occurred on several occasions. Sweden did sell ammunition and arms, as well as offering two divisions of volunteers that arrived in the final weeks of the war. However, on 19 February 1940, Sweden made a final decision not to commit herself to the war. The Allied Supreme Council, on 5 February, decided to give direct military assistance to Finland. Finland considered the involvement of the Western Powers until the final week of the war and they decided against it on two grounds. Firstly, the amount of men and weapons promised were only small in quantity and were volunteers. Mannerheim believed there would only be a maximum of 11,500 men, which would hardly be sufficient to defeat the Soviet Union.<23> Also, the decision came too late as the Mannerheim Line was under undue stress and would not hold until the troops could come, Mannerheim stated on 9 March that it would not hold long enough for assistance to arrive. Secondly, Finland had to decide what would be the consequences of Western involvement. It would tie Finland to a much larger war, that would last for an unknown time and the nation would probably be destroyed in the process.<24> The choice to accept the Soviet's peace terms seemed to be the viable option to ensure Finland's survival and independence.
The continuous support the Finns gave the government in Helsinki and the boycott of the Soviets' puppet government prevented the Soviets from taking over Finland politically. Immediately after their attack, the Soviet Union established the Democratic People's Republic of Finland in the occupied Terijoki. It was headed by Kuusinen, an ex-red soldier of the civil war, who was in exile since 1918 and was out of touch with public opinions in Finland.<25> The Soviets proclaimed this as the true government of Finland and refused to negotiate with the government of Helsinki. Finland responded by dissolving the previous government and forming a new government under the leadership. of Risto Ryti. This produced some confusion in Finland as it happened simultaneously with the formation of the Terijoki Government, which many Finns thought was the replacement.<26> The Soviets produced an abundant amount of propaganda in an attempt to arouse support for the Kuusinen government in Finland and to convince the world of their good intentions. However, this had the opposite effect with the Finns giving more support to the Ryti's government and stimulated more hatred towards the Soviet Union.<27> This forced the Soviets to disband their policy of a political takeover and begin to recognise the Helsinki government after 25 January. Thus, Finland's continuance of independence became more secure.
Many of the Finns were able to put aside conflicts between political ideology, which enabled them to fight a common cause that helped the Finnish achievement in the Winter War. Supporters of the Reds during the Civil War chose to defend their nation: 'They placed more importance on national values than on international ideology'.<28> National unity was encouraged by events like the January Betrothal, where the Central Organisation of Finnish trade unions and the Finnish employers' confederation who had a conflict of ideology and did not communicate decided to begin 'recognising each other as negotiating partners'. Designed to make labour market policies easier, it had a spiritual bonding effect on Finland, that promoted a strong and united fighting spirit.<29> With political unity strong the occupation of Finland would be a difficult task for the Soviet Union.
By submitting to the unjust demands of the Soviet Union, Finland avoided military occupation and possibly involvement in a world war. On 25 January 1940, the Soviets were willing to negotiate with the government in Helsinki; this was possibly due to the Kuusinen government's failure to attain significant public support and the threat of the involvement of the Western Powers in the war.<30> The Soviet territorial demands exceeded those that were made during the October-November negotiations in 1939. Finland lost about 12 per cent of her territory, including the valuable industrial city Vilpuri.<31> Peace between Finland and the Soviet Union was strongly supported by Sweden, but France and Britain were disappointed, as it ended their opportunity to obtain an advantage over Germany, by disrupting supplies she received from Sweden and the Soviet Union.<32> However, by accepting the terms Finland could end the conflict that had been threatening her independence and that had cost her so many lives.
The Finnish achievement in avoiding defeat during the Winter War was due to the determination of the Finns to maintain their independence which they only had for twenty years. Patriotic feelings and a loathing of the Soviet Union gave the spirit Finland needed to stand up. against a world power. The extreme winter conditions of 1939-1940 gave the Finns the advantage that they needed to successfully defend their nation and to have remarkable victories against a much larger force. This was also assisted by the implennentation of guerilla tactics that caught the Red Army off guard. The political unity and support of the government in Helsinki forced the Soviet Union to disband their policy of a political takeover. Careful considerations of the consequences of international involvement enabled a decision to end the war rather than prolonging it by becoming involved in a larger conflict, with no promises of remaining independent. Finally, the priority of making peace and submitting to the unjust demands set by the Soviet Union were hard on Finland, but ensured peace and independence for the time being.
The Continuation War (1941-1944) once again demonstrated Finland's determination to avoid defeat by the Soviet Union and to remain independent. At the conclusion of the Winter War (1939-1940) tension had escalated between Finland and the Soviet Union. The loss of territory and interference in internal affairs by the Soviet Union caused great resentment in Finland. The continuance of independence became reliant on Finland's ability to mould their foreign policy to suit the Great Power who could offer the best security. This led the Finns into a co-belligerency system with Germany. As the war turned against Finland it became increasingly important to preserve separate war aims to Germany to enable a separate peace to be negotiated. The Finns dedicated themselves not to agree to any peace terms unless their independence and freedom could be secured. Once the Russians agreed to a separate peace, Finland succeeded in breaking ties with Germany through evasive diplomacy, careful timing and great sacrifices. Even though the Soviet Union has played a significant role in Finnish affairs after the war, Finland has kept her autonomy unlike many other nations in eastern Europe.
After the Winter War the Finns held the Soviet Union in contempt and feared that their independence would be threatened again. The territorial cessions taken in the Treaty of Moscow (12 March 1940) were considered as grossly unjust. Finland complied with demands and the Parliament made extensive reforms to reconstruct the nation.<33> They also rebuilt their border fortifications and army immediately after the peace settlement. In order to avoid future confrontations, attempts were made to form a better relationship with the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union remained suspicious of Finland, making demands outside the parameters of the treaty of 1940 and interfering with internal politics. The Soviet Union opposed a defence alliance between the Scandinavian countries, applied immense pressure for the removal of Tanner from the government, and prohibited four candidates in the Presidential election held after Kallio had resigned.<34> Also, the open support Moscow gave to the Fenno-Soviet Society of Peace and Friendship. (a Finnish Communist organisation) sent threatening messages throughout Finland. This was amplified by the Soviet Union's treatment of the Baltic States, especially Estonia.<35> Fears were escalated when the Soviet Union made further territorial demands. These demands included access to the nickel mines in Petsamo, the occupation or demilitarisation of the Åland Islands and the return of property taken out of the Karelia after the Winter War.<36> There were also reports that indicated that Russia was preparing for an attack on Finland, while Germany was concentrating on the West after the fall of France and were commencing offensives against the British Isles. If Germany had been successful in its attack, the Russians might have proceeded with the taking of Petsamo. However, the Soviet leaders did not want to offend Germany who were reliant on the nickel exports of Finland.<37> The pressure and feelings of insecurity led Finland to change her foreign policy of neutrality.
The collaboration with Germany may have resulted in Finland's reputation being tarnished at the conclusion of the war, but enabled Finland to avoid the same fate as her Baltic neighbours. There have been many discrepancies between historians on the interpretation of what guided Finland into co-belligerency with Germany. Three schools of thought have emerged from this debate. The first school arose at the conclusion of the war and has Soviet origins. This theory held that 'fascist conspirators' were responsible for influencing the Finnish people into a collaboration with Hitler. This theory was used by the Russians to justify their harsh peace terms with Finland.<38> The second interpretation emerged shortly after the war and took an opposite point of view. This interpretation claimed that Finland's foreign policy was disposed by the actions and policies of the Great Powers, using the metaphor of 'Driftwood' that was being 'sucked into the German-Soviet vortex'.<39> A revision of both these interpretations became the third significant. school of thought in the late fifties. This basically interpreted Finnish foreign policy before the war as allowing the alleviation of the Soviet threat by an association with Germany and the opportunity of regaining the land annexed in 1940 in the event of a war.<40> The revisionist interpretation seems to be the most likely explanation, though most importantly the co-belligerence pact possibly enabled Finland to maintain its independence.
The preservation of separate war aims became essential to Finland as the Russian's counteroffensive began to overwhelm Finnish and German divisions. Finland needed to enter into separate peace negotiations to maintain its autonomy. There were many difficulties maintaining the war as independent to that of the Powers. Finland's main aims were to remain independent and to recapture the territory lost in the Winter War. The Finns did not share Hitler's idea of being 'comrades', which he proclaimed on 22 June 1941. This was demonstrated with Finland deciding to remain neutral after Germany's initial attack on 22 June, until the Russians bombed Helsinki on 25 June.<41> Neutrality was inhibited after giving Germany transit rights that enabled them to use Finnish soil to attack the Soviet Union. Also, Finland was drawn into the conflict due to the position of German troops and German bombing runs that curved over Finnish soil. The goal of a 'Greater Finland' was pronounced in Mannerheim's order of the day during July 1941, but was quickly disbanded for being 'unrealistic' and throughout the war it was 'limited to the lunatic fringe'.<42> The territory that was occupied beyond the 1939 border was only considered useful for defence and for bargaining in peace negotiations.<43>
Finland was continuously pressured by Germany to establish closer political and military ties. Finland was almost totally reliant on German imports of arms and food, which was exploited by Germany. This was seen by Germany holding 175,000 tons of grain to coerce Finland into signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in September 1941.<44> Mannerheim was a critic of the German's 'aggressive policy', 'arrogant... mentality' and viewed national socialism with disgust.<45> Even though he appreciated the benefits of the 'co-belligerency' Mannerheim attempted to avoid ties in German military operations. He refused to commit Finnish divisions to the German offensives in the East, though 1,400 volunteers served in the Ukraine against the wishes of the government.<46> The Finnish army ceased their offensive once the 1939 border was regained. Holding positions twenty miles north and north-west of Leningrad, Finland did not actively partake in the siege of the city. There is little to no evidence that implies that Finland shelled or allowed German troops to attack Leningrad from the north side. Thus, Ryti claimed that Finland had saved Leningrad during the war crime hearings.<47> These actions demonstrated to the Allies that Finland did not share Germany's military aims and thus they were fighting a separate war. This became important after a treaty signed between Britain and the Soviet Union on 26 May 1942 that prohibited both powers from entering into separate peace negotiations with Germany or any of her allies.<48> Since Finland was not considered an ally of Germany she was able to put 'peace feelers' out to Moscow and search for the quickest and safest way out of the war.
Through perfect timing, evasive diplomacy and great sacrifices Finland succeeded to meet the obligations set by the Soviet Union that allowed an armistice. By 1944, Finland was in a 'desperate state', with food shortages and the military situation turning against them.<49> Finland had became completely reliant on German resources and had to find new supplies if relations were to break off. Peace was desperately needed but would not be considered unless independence could be secured. If the Finns acted too soon they risked to be militarily taken over by Germany, like Hungary had been in April 1944. They had no guarantee by the Russians that they would protect Finland from Germany or if they would militarily take over Finland themselves. There was also the threat of a major conflict between the two great powers on Finnish soil, that would have had jeopardised Finland. Communication with and access to the West was still difficult or cut due to German occupation of Norway and Denmark. Germany was demanding that Finland stop. negotiations with the Soviet Union and pressuring her to make a guarantee of loyalty to Germany. President Ryti and Mannerheim devised a scheme which bought Finland time to avoid any complications. Ryti gave his personal assurance of Finland's commitment to Germany, but this only applied while he was President. When it appeared that Germany could no longer pose a threat, Mannerheim replaced Ryti on 1 August 1944 and began to break relations with Germany.
The Soviet Union was inhibited or too cautious to attempt to take over Finland. The Russians knew that the Finns would physically resist any installation of a government from their experience in the Winter War and the Kuusinen disaster. The Soviet Union could not afford the time or manpower to achieve a takeover of Finland, as the Red army was needed to occupy the maximum amount of Eastern Europe it could before Germany collapsed.<50> Thus, it was important to the Soviet Union to secure an armistice agreement to implement a stronger force in Eastern Europe. This was to Finland's favour as a peace agreement was needed to resolve the catastrophe that had engulfed the nation. Finland was at the mercy of the Soviet Union and could have fallen to military occupation if the Soviet Union was not deterred by the 'obvious world reaction' if this took place.<51> Therefore, it would have been difficult and dangerous for the Soviet Union to occupy Finland.
Finland managed to fulfil the armistice agreements and peace requirements and to ward off the Soviet threat. The armistice agreement came at a great cost to Finland. The expulsion of German troops was a difficult and costly task. The resistance was strong and the Nazi's practice of scorched earth caused approximately 120 million dollars (US) damage.<52> However, Finland managed to push the Germans out before the extended deadline in November. Demobilisation and the abolishment of all German ties were accomplished in the following month. The reparations were excessive, 600 million with large territorial cessions, most notably the port of Petsamo. The demands may have been designed to break the nation, but Finland fulfilled the demands. By accepting a lower standard of living, the reparations were paid off in 1952.<53> Parliament was obligated to pass legislation that made Communism legal and prohibited fascism. Finland was also obligated to enter into the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. The treaty established that if a foreign power should attempt to attack the Soviet Union through Finland military assistance could only occur with negotiation.<54>
The Soviet Union played an indirect role in internal affairs after the war. The presidential candidates were required to be vetted by the Kremlin. Communism was significant but did not become a major force in Finland. Communism achieved approximately 20 per cent of the vote in the post-war period and since the 1970s popularity has declined to under 10 per cent of the vote.<55> Admission into the United Nations in 1955 also gave a sense of security in Finland. Relations with the Soviet Union were improved by leaders such as J.K. Paaskivi, who succeeded Mannerheim. Paaskivi implemented a policy of uncompromising independence, but to keep. Soviet interest when a conflict of foreign policy should occur and to inspire sincerity of this policy to the Soviet Union.<56> While other democratic nations were criticising the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, Finland maintained a policy of 'self censorship' or Finlandisation. Finnish leaders attempted to avoid irritating the Russians and in some instances abided by their requests.<57> By following such policies and fulfilling the Soviet Union's demands after the Continuation War, Finland avoided the same fate as other nations that were 'liberated' by the Red Army.
Finland had once again defended her independence in a global conflict that engulfed and destroyed many other nations. The co-belligerency with Germany enabled Finland to ward off the Soviet threat and as the war turned against the Axis Powers Finland was able to disengage to prevent total destruction of the nation. This was achieved by preserving separate war aims to Germany and the evasive political manoeuvre conducted by Ryti and Mannerheim. Though the peace had came at a cost, Finland's autonomy remained by fulfilling the requirements of the armistice set by the Soviet Union. This was also assisted by memories of the Winter War, the need for Russian troops else where and the condemnation by the West if Finland was occupied. Finland secured her independence after the war by paying the war reparations, improving relations with the Soviet Union through such measures as Finlandisation and entering into organisations such as the United Nations. The Finns had once again demonstrated their determination to avoid defeat by the Soviet Union and maintained their independence.
|Estimates of how long war supplies would last in event of war|
for rifles, quick fire machine guns and machine guns
81 mm grenade projectiles
7 mm shells for field guns
122 mm shells for field howitzers
Shells for heavy artillery
Fuel and lubricating oil
|Source: Mannerheim (1953, p. 324).|
Griffiths, 1993, pp. 64, 88-89, 91, 100.
<2> Upton, 1974, p. 21.
<3> Wourinen, 1948, pp. 34-36.
<4> Tarkka, 1991, p. 17.
<5> Wuorinen, op-cit, pp. 16, 17, 26.
<6> Ibid, p. 55.
<7> Griffiths, op-cit, p. 152.
<8> Mannerheim, 1953, p. 328-329.
<9> Tarkka, op-cit, p. 17.
<10> Wourinen, op-cit, p. 42: Mannerheim, op-cit, p. 324.
<11> Mannerheim, op-cit, pp. 336-7, 340.
<12> Werth (1964, pp. 74).
<13> Mannerheim, op-cit, p. 326.
<14> Ibid, pp. 326-327.
<15> Jutikkala and Pirinen, 1974, pp. 277-278.
<16> Mannerhiem, op-cit, p. 351.
<17> Werth, op-cit, p. 79.
<18> Tarkka, op-cit, p. 23.
<19> Wourenin, op-cit, p. 68.
<20> Ibid, p. 72.
<21> Nevakivi, 1972, pp. 5-6.
<22> Wuoreinen, 1948, op-cit, p. 43.
<23> Mannerheim, 1953, op-cit, p. 359.
<24> Wourinen, op-cit, p. 73.
<25> Griffiths, op-cit, p. 153.
<26> Nevakivi, 1972, op-cit, p. 43.
<27> Upton, op-cit, p. 45.
<28> Tarkka, op-cit, p. 18.
<29>Ibid, pp. 19-20.
<30> Wourinen, op-cit, pp. 73-74.
Griffiths, op-cit, p. 155.
<32> Wourinen, op-cit, pp 70-71.
<33> Wuorinen,1948, pp. 81, 88.
<34> Jutikkala and Pirinen, 1974, p. 279.
<35> Tarkka, 1991, p. 29.
<36> Foster, 1979, pp. 111-112.
<37> Krosby, 1968, pp. 68-69.
<38> Foster, op-cit, p. 110.
<39> Ibid, pp. 110-111.
<40> Ibid, p. 114.
<41> Griffiths, 1993, p. 157 and Jutikkala, op-cit, pp.181-2.
<42> Werth, 1964, p. 362.
<43> Derry, 1979, p. 344 and Jutikkala op-cit p. 282
<44> Tarkka, op-cit, p. 55.
<45> Jägerskiöld, 1986, p. 145.
<46> Derry, op-cit, p. 344.
<47> Werth, op-cit, pp. 360-362.
<48> Wourinen, op-cit, p. 149.
<49> Griffiths, op-cit, p. 158.
<50> Wourinen, op-cit, p. 177.
<51> Gleason and Aandahl, 1976, p. 434.
<52> Griffiths, op-cit, p. 159.
<53> Griffiths, op-cit, p. 160.
<54> Jutikkala, op-cit, p. 286.
<55> Laqueur, 1992, p. 502.
<56> Ibid, pp. 285-286.
<57> Laqueur, op-cit, pp. 501-502.
A. (1979), History of Scandinavia, University of Minnesota
Foster, K. (1979), 'Finland's Foreign Policy 1940-1941: An Ongoing Historiographic Controversy', Scandinavian Studies, vol 51, pp. 109-123.
Gleason and Aandahl (1976), 'Interest of the United States in the Maintenance the Independence of Finland as a Sovereign State', in Foreign Relations of the United States 1949. Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, vol. V, United States Printing Office, pp. 434-450, 574-589.
Griffiths, T. (1993), Scandinavia, second edition, Wakefield Press.
Jägerskiöld, S. (1986), Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Jutikkala, E. and Pirinen, K. (1974), A History of Finland, Praeger Publishers, New York.
Krosby, H.P. (1968), Finland, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1940-1941. The Petsamo Dispute, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.
Laqueur, W. (1992), Europe in Our Time, A History 1945-1992, Penguin Books, USA.
Mannerheim, G. (1953), The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, Cassell, London.
Nevakivi, J. (1972), The Appeal That was Never Made. The Allies, Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War 1939-1940, C. Hurst and Company, London.
Tarkka, J. (1991), Neither Stalin Nor Hitler. Finland During the Second World War, Otava Publishing Company, Helsinki.
Upton, A.F. (1974), Finland 1939-1940, Davis-Poynter, London.
Werth, A. (1964), Russia at War 1941-1945, Barrio and Rockliff, London.
Wuorinen, J.H. (1948), Finland and World War Two 1939-1944, Greenwood Press Publishers, Connecticut.